The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

12/29

Dave —

Could you
get the attached
to Cy when can —
request?

Prepared in O/DCI: Distribution by D/ES (31 Dec 79)
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   ER

25X1

The Honorable David D. Newsom
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

79-2290

12/29

Cy —

Because the imposition of sanctions appears to be such a watershed, I did some brainstorming with our analysts on other approaches to securing release of the hostages. Attached is a 1¼ page think piece — it's all policy and your business — accordingly I drop it with you and let it go at that —

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

29 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
                 Secretary of State
                 Secretary of Defense
                 Assistant to the President for
                   National Security Affairs

    Attached is a think piece which I believe
you might find interesting. It discusses the
kinds of pressures and inducements to which we
believe Khomeini, the Revolutionary Council and
the kidnappers would each most likely be
responsive.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment
 NFAC Memorandum,
   29 Dec 1979

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

29 December 1979

MEMORANDUM

THE OUTLOOK OF KHOMEINI, THE FORCES OCCUPYING
THE EMBASSY, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
TOWARDS PRESSURES OR INDUCEMENTS
FROM THE US ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE

The US handling of the hostage crisis in Iran has
been complicated from the start by the lack of any
authoritative power center in Tehran. Three major
actors--Ayotollah Khomeini, the forces occupying the
Embassy, and the Revolutionary Council--have responded
to US initiatives with conflicting statements which
indicate a complicated pattern of political relationships.

  --Although both the forces occupying the Embassy
    and the Revolutionary Council are ultimately
    responsive to Khomeini's orders, Khomeini has
    apparently responded to events rather than having
    directed them.

  --The forces occupying the Embassy have rejected the
    authority of the Revolutionary Council and have
    dealt from a position of strength because of Khomeini's
    continuing support for the occupation. On the
    other hand, Revolutionary Council members have
    sustained direct access to Khomeini--which the

_This paper was prepared in the Office of Political
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Scientific
Intelligence, Office of Strategic Research, and Office of
Economic Research. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to Chief, Iran Analytic Center, Office of
Political Analysis._

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28 Dec 1979

2 JAN 1980

25X1   NOTE TO

25X1   Tell [   ] I would like to take home for the weekend a paper I

had a while ago probably buried in all these documents I haven't read

(1) on how we are planning to cope with societal change. Connected with that,

I would like to take home a document that the DDCI submitted to the

(2) Political Intelligence Working Group on Improved Political Intelligence

25X1   [   ] Both of the latter

should be within the last few months, I believe.

ST

done

Protecting the CIA

Whenever the Central Intelligence Agency puts an agent in the field, it is taking the chance that the information it has given him may someday be used against it. It makes every effort it can, of course, to minimize the risk, including requiring its agents to agree in writing not to publish anything without agency approval after they leave.

In recent years, however, several incidents have suggested that those precautions are inadequate. According to CIA director Stansfield Turner, in a letter to Texas Sen. Lloyd Bentsen which the senator released this week, a number of former CIA officers "are avowedly determined to destroy the agency" by publicly revealing the names of agents stationed abroad.

The chief offender Turner cited, former agent Philip Agee, now living in Europe, has a new book called "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," which provides instructions for identifying and exposing CIA personnel and claims to name more than 700 agents in Europe alone.

All told, Agee has identified 1,200 individuals as agency operatives, Turner says, and he acknowledges that a substantial number of the identifications have been accurate.

The consequences of such publicity have naturally been disastrous for U.S. intelligence-gathering. Not only have the disclosures jeopardized the lives of the individuals directly involved, as well as the lives of their foreign contacts, but they have also made potential sources understandably reluctant to cooperate with the agency in any way.

These CIA turncoats, then—no milder term seems appropriate—are in effect, if not in fact, functioning as double agents, at the expense of their own country's security.

At present, however, there is no law specifically forbidding such unauthorized public identifications. Bentsen has introduced a bill which would make their acts a crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and it awaits action by the Senate as a whole.

Such action is clearly essential. The CIA has been plagued with many problems over the past few years, many of them of its own making. But no intelligence organization, however superbly managed, could possibly continue to operate indefinitely under the conditions the present legal situation imposes. If this gaping hole is left unplugged, there can be little hope of the CIA's ever becoming the more effective intelligence-gatherer its critics claim to want.

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 December 1979

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Dear

      Thanks for your memo of December 6th, in
which you recommended that we here at the Agency
set aside time for a prayer vigil for the hostages
in Iran. Your recommendation helped us to form
the program we held in the auditorium on National
Unity Day on December 18th.

      Again, thanks for giving us your thoughts on
how we in the Agency might express our support
and prayers for our fellow Americans being detained
in Iran.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

Room 3D 5332
CIA Headquarters